Training Games: An Application of Game Theory to Clinical Psychology Graduate Training by Cornell, Benjamin David
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Graduate School of Professional Psychology: 
Doctoral Papers and Masters Projects Graduate School of Professional Psychology 
2018 
Training Games: An Application of Game Theory to Clinical 
Psychology Graduate Training 
Benjamin David Cornell 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/capstone_masters 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Higher Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cornell, Benjamin David, "Training Games: An Application of Game Theory to Clinical Psychology Graduate 
Training" (2018). Graduate School of Professional Psychology: Doctoral Papers and Masters Projects. 
293. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/capstone_masters/293 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
This Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School of Professional Psychology at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate School of Professional Psychology: 
Doctoral Papers and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
 






An Application of Game Theory to Clinical Psychology Graduate Training 
   
A DOCTORAL PAPER 
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER 
  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 












APPROVED:     ____________________________ 





























“All I do is separate the game from the truth.” 
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Groundwork1 
Game Theory 
Game theory is a conceptual framework for studying the behavior of participants in 
“situations of conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers” (Tadelis, 2013, p.xi) as 
well as those situations (called “games”) themselves.  Specifically, game theory is concerned 
with “strategic” decision-making, meaning decisions made by one participant which take into 
account the behavior of other participants in the system.  To illustrate: 
“Think of the difference between the decisions of a lumberjack and those of a general.  
When the lumberjack decides how to chop wood, he does not expect the wood to fight 
back; his environment is neutral.  But when the general tries to cut down the enemy’s 
army, he must anticipate and overcome resistance to his plans” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1993, 
p. 1). 
As such, Game Theory’s games are by definition “multi-agent” systems, in that they involve 
more than one “decision maker” in interaction. 
 To a game theorist, a game is often laid out in a decision tree, (or more commonly a grid, 
but a tree is a better visual) where a branching set of successive decisions and corresponding 
responsive decisions lead from each player at the start of a game to a set of possible “outcomes” 
or “payouts” at the outermost branches of the tree.  Different games have different 
characteristics, some of the most important of which are whether they are zero-sum or non-zero-
sum; whether moves are made sequentially or simultaneously; whether players possess complete 
                                               
1 A Note on Terminology 
Calling such interpersonally intimate activities as psychotherapy and supervision of psychotherapy “games” has a 
decidedly cynical ring to it, especially at first glance.  Within the mathematical and logical discipline called “Game 
Theory,” a “game” is a situation with a specific set of characteristics, but referring to a situation as a “game” says 
nothing about its emotional significance.  Similarly, calling an individual’s decision-making “strategic” only implies 
that it takes other agents into account, but not (necessarily) that it is especially selfish, cold, or manipulative.   
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or incomplete information about one another; and whether or not players can communicate with 
one another or learn from their opponent’s past behavior (Straffin, 2004). The characteristics or 
rulesets of different games lead players to play them differently, with different sorts of games 
preferencing different sorts of strategies.   
 As an academic discipline, Game Theory was originally focused on formal abstractions 
of conflict and cooperation, with well-defined rules, choices, and outcomes.  Over time, though, 
its applicability has proven to be surprisingly broad, with substantive contributions to such varied 
fields as economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology.  In abstract games, things like 
behavioral probabilities, and the precise point at which strategies become “stable” or optimal, are 
represented with variables, such that they can be calculated with perfect accuracy given 
numerically precise input parameters (Tadelis, 2013).  When game theory is used as a lens 
through which to understand phenomena in the natural or social world, it is primarily an 
application of principles derived from the play of abstract games rather than a calculation of 
precise quantities or formulae. In order to apply those principles, the game theorist articulates 
bounded “games” in the environment, the “rules” of which are the practical constraints naturally 
encountered by a player in the game under consideration.  Just as a first date could equally be 
seen as an “emotional transaction” or a “struggle for dominance,” so too could it be understood 
as a “game.” 
The players in game theory’s games are assumed to be “rational,” meaning that each 
player’s behavior serves to maximize her individual “payout.”  This is not to say that all the 
players want the same thing, but instead that all players behave in a way that (as far as the player 
knows) is most likely to result in what they, individually, want.  The application of game theory 
to evolutionary biology is a particularly salient model in that evolutionary game theorists often 
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“work backwards” by starting with the observed behavior of organisms in the natural world and 
using these observations to understand the nature of the environment to which those behaviors 
were the optimal response (Dawkins, 1976).  In other words, one can learn a lot about the context 
in which an organism evolved or developed by watching what it does, asking “what is the game 
for which these behaviors are the best strategy?” and then “finding” that game in the organism’s 
environment. 
With this working assumption in mind—that observed behavior is the individually 
optimal response to the strategic situation as perceived by the individual—we can infer the 
nature of the game a player is playing by observing what she does, just as we can infer what a 
rational agent will do if we completely understand the game in which she finds herself.  So, 
considering psychology and game theory together, both the question “What game is this person 
playing optimally?” and “How would a person play this game optimally?” are relevant.  When 
we encounter apparently irrational behavior, we can just as easily assume that we have missing 
information about the game perceived by the player, as to assume his behavior no longer 
conforms to “rationality.” For example, even individuals with far higher hourly incomes than 
landscapers charge have been known to mow their own lawns, and this task is easily recognized 
as potentially rational because of the intangible mental “payoffs” it might provide such as a 
break from the kids, the satisfaction of physical activity, or reinforcement of an image of oneself 
as “the kind of person who does their own yard work.” 
Game Theory and the System of Clinical Psychology Graduate Training 
 Clinical Psychology, as its own system within the larger system of human society, 
presumes to provide the service of somehow ameliorating problematic behavioral and 
psychological functioning.  Within this context, the discipline of psychotherapy is perhaps most 
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directly concerned with the task of affecting change in individual psychology.  In the 
“Recognition of Psychotherapy Effectiveness,” the American Psychological Association (2012, 
p. 102) defines “psychotherapy” as “the informed and intentional application of clinical methods 
and interpersonal stances derived from established psychological principles for the purpose of 
assisting people to modify their behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and/or other personal 
characteristics in directions that the participants deem desirable.”  The APA concluded that from 
the body of research comparing the effectiveness of various therapeutic modalities, “(1) most 
valid and structured psychotherapies are roughly equivalent in effectiveness and (2) patient and 
therapist characteristics, which are not usually captured by a patient's diagnosis or by the 
therapist's use of a specific psychotherapy, affect the results”  (p. 103).  
The effect of “therapist characteristics” on “the results” can potentially be quite large, 
such as that noted in Miller, Hubble, and Duncan’s (2007) analysis of Wampold and Brown’s 
(2005) study of client outcome across a sample of 581 mental health clinicians.  They noted that 
“clients of the best therapists in the sample improved at a rate at least 50 percent higher and 
dropped out at a rate at least 50 percent lower than those assigned to the worst clinicians in the 
sample,” and that “drugs used in combination with talk therapy were 10 times more effective 
with the best therapists than with the worst “ (Miller, Hubble, & Duncan, 2007, p. 28). 
While drawing substantive conclusions about the causal factors behind differences in 
client outcomes on a wide scale is generally difficult, clinician expertise seems to be a central 
contributor and the only one the therapist has more or less direct control over.  The institution 
clinical psychology graduate training is precisely concerned with instilling this expertise; 
generally trying to teach aspiring therapists to do and say things that are more effective in 
encouraging positive psychological change than the alternatives. At least according to the APA, 
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client outcomes are at least partially determined by the therapists abilities, skills, and attitudes, 
and a therapist’s abilities, skills, and attitudes are at least partially determined by her training. 
So, at its most basic, the system of graduate training in clinical psychology concerns itself 
with conveying knowledge, skills, and credentials (for a fee) to students who are willing to pay 
for an opportunity to acquire them. Clinical psychology graduate training generally represents a 
somewhat cooperative task shared by training institutions and the students they train, with the 
ostensibly shared goal of producing competent practitioners with skills that will be valued in the 
economic marketplace and the “marketplace of ideas” of clinical psychology academia.  Larkin 
(2015), for example, summarizes the goal of the training program as “creat[ing] well-socialized, 
ethical, and professional psychologists,” (p. 304) though other training directors and program 
designers would doubtless describe what they are trying to produce in different terms.  This 
overarching goal, and the “point” of the highest-level game in the system under consideration, 
orients all the other games being played in the system. This is not to say that in practice, the 
system might not be “pointed” at something else like financial gain, self-perpetuation, the 
psychological well-being of the larger society, or the advancement of particular political 
interests, just as the point of a chess game might be to develop the relationship between the 
players, entertain others, or sublimate aggression.  But, some agenda like “creat[ing] well 
socialized, ethical, and professional psychologists” is the presumable answer to the question 
“What is this system supposed to be for?” 
Psychological Payouts, Reconciling Game Theory and Clinical Psychology 
In one sense, game theory and clinical psychology are exact opposites; the former 
concerns optimal play within a given ruleset and the latter concerns the infinite variation, 
development, and meaning of suboptimal behavior in humans.  Comparing a relatively formal 
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game like chess to something like an admissions interview for a doctoral program in clinical 
psychology, it is immediately clear that the ruleset for the interview is far larger, reflective of the 
relative freedom of decision-making in an interpersonal playing field.  But, both a chess player 
and an admissions-interviewee face a series of decisions between mutually exclusive alternative 
actions.  The chess player cannot choose to both move her bishop and not move it on a given 
turn, and the interviewee cannot both tell a potentially-risky personal anecdote and not tell it.  
Both the chess player and the interviewee can be understood to be deciding between these 
alternatives primarily in reference to their desired outcome (something like “achieve a 
checkmate,” on the one hand, and “convince this interviewer that I belong here” on the other).  
At first glance, people routinely play the “games” they encounter suboptimally. For 
example, human beings make reliably skewed decisions when their consideration of alternatives 
involves very large, or very small statistical probabilities, and respond disproportionately to 
emotionally evocative eventualities (Kahneman, 2011; Wilson, 2002). In a very simple view, 
these phenomena could be seen as proof positive that human beings are not game theory’s 
“rational agents,” because they reliably behave contrary to the aim of maximizing their own 
payout, as all game theory’s “players” do.  The aforementioned chess player “misreads” the 
board and falls into traps, while the interviewee aims at displaying emotional vulnerability, but 
convinces his interviewer only that he has “poor boundaries.”  How do we make sense of the 
difference between “optimal” and “actually observed” here?  Some of it is doubtless due to 
imperfect or ambiguous information and the limited processing power of the human mind, but 
the rest could be seen as the presence of something like “psychological payout modifiers” which 
modify the felt value of the available material or relational payouts. Operationally, we might 
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define the psychological component of outcomes as the idiosyncratic meaning which the 
individual player assigns to each individual outcome on the payout table. 
Pattern recognition is one of the core functions of the human mind, at levels as basic as 
making sense of visual information, and picking out the boundaries of objects in the visual field, 
and as heady as the process of distilling emotional experience into “organizing principles” 
(Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997) that guide how all information is perceived and shape 
behavior outside of awareness. Fonagy et al, (2003, p. 416) describe a learning system that 
occurs in the first years of life, which result in, 
The creation of a processing system for the self (and significant others) in terms of a set 
of stable and generalized intentional attributes, such as desires, emotions, intentions, and 
beliefs inferred from recurring invariant patterns in the history of previous interactions. 
The child comes to be able to use this representational system to predict the other’s or the 
self’s behavior conjunction with local, more transient intentional states inferred from a 
given situation. 
Importantly, the creation of this “processing system,” or “system of organization,” occurs in the 
particular child’s individual developmental context, which will necessarily bear only limited 
resemblance to interpersonal contexts encountered later in the individual’s life.  Also, the 
individual will likely have only limited awareness that her predictions are based on that 
particular data set, and that those predictions may be therefore skewed when applied to novel 
environments.  Brandchaft, Doctors, and Sorter (2010) note that:  
In the absence of sufficient self-awareness, the individual is blind to his role in 
structuring his own reality.  The world in which he lives is experienced as though it were 
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something independently and objectively real, rather than as something partly constituted 
by his own organizing principles (p. 52).   
The individual understands situations based on his predictions about what will happen in 
them, what behaviors are likely to result in the most favorable outcomes, and how particular 
outcomes are likely to “feel.” And, the particular way that specific outcomes feel is similarly 
subject to modulation through this same organizational structure.  
It is useful to notice that—especially in looking at games played by humans in relational 
situations—a person's individual set of possible “payouts” in a given situation roughly constitute 
her “agenda.”  Whether she is making choices at a conscious level, cognitively weighing the 
risks and rewards of various actions, or responding unconsciously and toward ends which are not 
consciously symbolized, she “pursues” the best-possible-outcome-all-things-considered, as 
determined by her personal psychological organization.  For example, agendas “pursued” by a 
student in a given hour of a psychological diagnosis course might include “sounding smart,” 
“doing as little work as possible while maintaining an ‘A’,” and “tamping down an insidious 
doubt about being characterologically unsuited for psychotherapy and graduate school.”  
In those terms, game theory’s assumption of “rational agents” is directly equivalent to 
Skinner’s (1965) supposition that an organism’s behavior is determined by the interplay of its 
reinforcement history and its environment.  Relatedly, many of the theoretical sub-disciplines of 
historical and contemporary psychoanalysis tend to deal primarily with psychological behavior 
resulting from prior experience and “meaning making” (Buirski & Haglund, 2001), and 
interacting as a pre-constructed ruleset for subsequent encounters with “objects” (Mitchell, 1986) 
in the internal and external world.  
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The therapeutic encounter, conceptualized by Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft (2014) 
“as an intersubjective process involving a dialogue between two personal universes” (p. 46) 
might yield a game theoretic understanding (i.e., the “game” inferred from the “behavior” 
observed in the interplay between analysand and analyst in a psychoanalysis) of something like 
“two agents, one of which pursues agendas such as ‘feeling better,’ ‘impressing the analyst,’ 
while the other pursues aims like ‘inducing the analysand to speak openly about his thoughts,’ 
and “getting the analysand to pay me.” In this view, if one put real people with their own lifetime 
of memories into the formal games of game theory, one would expect their behavior to deviate 
from mathematically optimal play to the precise extent dictated by their idiosyncratic 
biopsychosocial makeup.  Inversely, if we added our “psychological payout modifiers” to the 
rational agents in game theory, we would expect them to play like real people. 
While game theory has an established tradition of application to social psychology, there 
is some disagreement about its compatibility with clinical psychology’s understanding of human 
behavior. Flabbi and Pediconi (2014, p. 354) argue that this construct is incompatible with the 
classical psychoanalytic view of the drive-governed human unconscious:  
The law [of strategic interaction] established by game theory not only does not share the 
main features of the Freudian unconscious, but it is actually in fundamental opposition to 
it… Game theory describes interactions as implemented in a mathematical function: a 
given input maps always and immutably to a given output… It is the opposite of the 
concept of drive that, by definition, needs the other to be established in the subject.” 
Their contention is that the rational decision maker makes her decisions consciously in pursuit of 
her best payout, while the unconscious directs behavior toward the satisfaction of drives whose 
“aims” may well confound payout maximization. 
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However, in order for a “given input” to map to a known output, the characteristics of the 
input must be known completely.  When looking at human behavior like a psychologist might, 
the “input” is generally something like the comprehensive reinforcement history of the subject as 
well as that of all other agents in the system, as well as the specific “ruleset” of the game in 
question.  In that sense, Flabbi & Pediconi’s drives that “need the other to be established in the 
subject” are implicit in the consideration of each individual’s “payout scheme.”  One outcome 
will be more desirable than another due to the influence of the object of a drive, because “The 
principle of rational action still guides impulsive acts but as a function of available evidence 
about the ‘pragmatic’ aspects of a goal object, about the specific situational constraints on action, 
and about the dispositional constraints characteristic of the actor” (Fonagy et. al., 2003, p. 445). 
A similar contention is that the strategic analysis of a situation neglects the situation’s 
meaning: “While there is internal conflict in game theory. . . it is a conflict over making the right 
quantitative choice. It is a conflict of costs and benefits, of summing up quantitative amounts. 
What is principally missing from the intricately worked out calculus of game theory is 
meaning—especially, the meaning of the moves”  (Alper, 1993 p. 52).  It is exactly “the meaning 
of the moves” that the present discussion hopes to explore as we look at strategic behavior such 
as that employed by therapists and clients in psychotherapy or by individuals unconsciously 
selecting between a set of available “defense mechanisms” (Freud, 1937).  The “choice” of 
meaning we assign to particular behaviors has substantial strategic significance in how it shapes 
the perceived game, the range of behaviors the individual “allows” herself and others, and the 
psychological and behavioral responses she makes to the strategic behavior of others.  
If—in confronting the particular game of the doctoral paper requirement at the University 
of Denver’s Graduate School of Professional Psychology’s Psy.D. program—I respond by 
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writing about psychology and game theory and investing more time than would have been 
optimal to get the “rubber stamp” toward my degree, there are conclusions to be drawn about my 
conscious and unconscious agendas in the doctoral paper game, and about the nature of the game 
which I idiosyncratically perceive.   
Perhaps, in addition to being a graduation requirement, I also see a playspace with 
opportunities to induce cherished mentors to say approving things about me.  My choice to try to 
demonstrate the usefulness of viewing nuanced interpersonal interactions strategically may be an 
attempt to paint my pre-existing tendency to see things this way as “legitimate and valuable,” 
rather than “vaguely distasteful.” Choosing a topic that I suspected had a “decidedly cynical ring 
to it,” may have been aimed at a payout of reinforcing a fantasy of myself as someone with 
“interesting and dissident ideas,” and persuading others of the same.  These choices and their 
corresponding hoped-for outcomes—whether consciously symbolized or not—carry the unique 
meaning I have made of myself in relation to the game at hand. 
Alper’s dismissal of meaning in strategic consideration mirrors the attitude that 
behaviorists and evolutionary biologists face when existing within the dominant framework of 
what Harari (2015) calls the “Humanist Religion.”  In Harari’s language, “Religion is…any all-
encompassing story that confers superhuman legitimacy on human laws, norms and values…by 
arguing that they reflect superhuman laws” (p. 211). The behaviorist and the biologist see 
humans as sites of often-conditioned behavior generation, while humanist dogma demands 
noncritical acceptance of the foundational truths that “Homo sapiens has a unique and sacred 
nature…that the unique nature of Homo sapiens is the most important thing in the world, and it 
determines the meaning of everything that happens in the universe” (Harari, 2011, p. 256). 
Because the behaviorist exists within a humanist hegemony, his means of inquiry (which 
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blaspheme the sacredness of the free-willed agent and meaning maker by offering “explanations” 
for behavior that arise from the environment rather than from self-determination) are labeled 
“cynical.” To some degree, the psychotherapist may find herself in a similar position when 
suggesting that a client's behavior might arise from influences outside his awareness.  
 
Games in the Training of Psychotherapists 
Prisoners’ Dilemmas, Internship and Graduate Applicant Selection 
The bookends of a clinical psychology doctoral student’s graduate training are the 
application process for graduate school at the beginning and the Association of Psychology 
Postdoctoral and Internship Centers (APPIC) national internship match at the end. These two 
contexts incorporate some of the most obviously competitive games in the graduate training 
process, as applicants and prospective interns compete for a finite number of desirable “places” 
at attractive programs, while graduate programs and internship sites compete for a finite pool of 
attractive applicants.  
These games have many aspects in common with one of Game Theory’s most famous 
games, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991).  The classic formulation of this 
game is a situation in which two prisoners are facing sentencing and deciding whether to 
“snitch” on one another.  Though the precise numbers in question aren’t important, if the 
prisoners “cooperate” (with one another, not the hypothetical police) they get a relatively “good” 
outcome (say, one year in prison).  If both prisoners “defect” (snitch on one another) they both 
get a “bad” outcome (say five years in jail, each).  Finally, if one prisoner stays quiet and one 
talks, the one who defects gets a “best” outcome (immediate release) and the one who stays quiet 
gets a “worst” outcome (ten years).  The “dilemma” part is that both know they will fare better 
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overall by cooperating, but each knows that in each situation they will do better individually by 
choosing to “defect.” So even though they both get five years by defecting instead of one year 
for cooperating with each other, neither can pass up the strategic opportunity of immediate 
release, and thus doom themselves to the “second worst” outcome.  
One of the interesting characteristics of this particular game is that it has what is known 
as a “dominant strategy.”  For a player in the prisoner’s dilemma, the “defect” strategy is “better 
for him than all of his other other available strategies no matter what strategy or strategy 
combination the other player or players choose” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008 p. 70). In practical 
application to situations identifiable as “prisoners’ dilemmas,” the presence of this dominant 
strategy of defection means that players can be expected to be primarily motivated by self-
interest rather than collective interest, except where idiosyncratic psychological organization  
incentivizes self-interest to coincide with collective interest.  While the applicant who happens to 
prize honesty over career ambition might be inclined to disclose probably-invalidating 
information in an admissions interview, the “default” agenda of applicants in interviews is to 
present themselves in that light they perceive to be most compatible with the future outcome of 
an “offer letter.”  
 The dominant strategy of defection for each applicant and each program considering just 
this one application, means it is nearly always strategically “wise” to attempt some degree of 
deception.  If this game were played totally cooperatively by all parties involved, it might look 
something like this:  A number of applicants apply to a number of graduate programs.  In the 
admissions interviews, each applicant meets with a representative of each graduate institution, 
and during the meetings, the applicant and the representative describe to one another, with 
absolute honesty and perfect articulation, the qualities of the applicant and the graduate program 
 
TRAINING GAMES                                                       17 
respectively (assuming they have perfect information about their own characteristics). Each pair 
arrives at a perfectly accurate estimate of the “fit” between the applicant and the program, and 
makes their admissions decisions accordingly.  At the end of the day, everyone is either happy 
with where they ended up (or who they got), or else they know their spot or their preferred 
applicant went to an objectively “better match.”   
As predicted by the prisoner’s dilemma, though, the players in this game all choose to 
play at least a little bit “in bad faith,” because both graduate institutions and applicants have 
superior individual outcomes if they over-represent their quality of their “fit” with one another.  
So whether it is padding one’s resume and rehearsing interview questions on the applicant’s side, 
or a graduate program’s “lies of omission” about how difficult it is for graduates to find work 
after they complete the program, such defections are ubiquitous.  
All the players attempt to thwart one another’s attempted defection in an ongoing “arms 
race” of deception and intelligence-gathering, which is based on each players ability to 
convincingly perform their chosen role, and her ability to “see through” her opponents attempts 
to present themselves as other than they actually are.  In game theory, a “screening move” (Dixit 
& Nalebuff, 2009) is a move which functions to determine whether a player’s behavior is a sign 
(accurate representation) or a signal (communicated misrepresentation) of the characteristic 
under consideration.  In other words, a screening move is a strategy I devise to get you to tell me 
what you’re really like, or to determine if you are really like you say you are. 
Interview questions are generally  “moves” of this kind, for example, in that they 
simultaneously ask an interviewee to describe their own characteristics but also to demonstrate 
them in the cognitive task of answering the question, under the interviewer’s observation.  The 
applicant’s “screening behavior” is likely more subtle, like floating a personal disclosure or a 
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joke judged to be on the edge of acceptability for the present context in order to “see how it 
lands,” and thus discern his opponent’s type.  All participants are likely to ask “screening 
questions” without obviously “right” answers because opponents that are not given obvious 
signals about how to behave are more likely to behave according to their “true” psychological 
organization. So when “less prestigious” institutions focus solely on their “welcoming learning 
environment,” applicants may begin to ask about graduates’ average income. And when 
applicants begin to notice that stressing their commitment to multicultural competence “plays 
well” most places (or doesn’t, for applicants of color) and “perform” accordingly, interviewers 
develop more incisive follow-up questions. 
While this could equally be said about personnel selection for a tech startup or graduate 
students in veterinary medicine, in clinical psychology, personal characteristics play a unique 
role in the question of suitability for the position. Ivey and Partington (2014 p. 166) note, 
“Selectors are…tasked with evaluating applicants’ reasons for wanting to become psychologists, 
their psychological stability, emotional maturity and capacity for empathy and self-insight.” 
Though this study focused specifically on how assessors evaluated essays, much of the graduate 
institution’s task in applicant selection amounts to various attempts to measure these kinds of 
attributes. 
In other fields, the limitations of self-report as an assessment method are sidestepped with 
something like an “audition” or “portfolio.”  Musicians have long understood that when the band 
is looking for a new guitarist, it is more efficient to have an “applicants”  play the guitar in an 
“interview” than to ask them to talk about their guitar-playing abilities.  This screening move 
circumvents the tendency of participants in prisoners dilemma of guitarist selection to choose the 
dominant strategy of “defection” and signal abilities in excess of reality. In psychology, some 
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programs take a similarly direct tack to the “audition,” handing out vignettes which model 
hypothetical clinical situations, and asking interviewees to provide diagnoses, 
conceptualizations, or treatment plans; or enlisting their most thespian staff member to be 
assessed and “case-presentationed” upon by perspiring interviewees.  Perhaps more commonly, 
interviewers perform “unstructured” assessment of factors like “intuition,” “self-awareness,” or 
“psychological mindedness” through what they observe, intuit, or infer while the interviewee 
responds to a series of more-or-less “standard” interview questions.  
In their 2014 study, Ivey and Partington studied a group of admissions essay readers at a 
clinical psychology graduate program assessed and selected for a characteristic they called 
“woundedness” which they noted “include[s] experiences of early object loss, loneliness, 
emotional deprivation and absence of appropriate intimacy, failure of carers to meet 
developmental narcissistic needs, and guilt about not having lived up to parental expectations (p. 
167).  They found that “the preferred applicant protocols chosen by almost all participant 
selectors (nine out of ten) as being most suitable for clinical training evidenced woundedness, 
and almost all participants considered protocols where this was absent as least suitable” (p. 170). 
The selectors interviewed made a distinction between woundedness and “impairment” which 
they said designated “problematic psychological states implicated in deficient professional 
attitudes and behavior” (p. 168). Within this one “factor” where readers are subjectively 
assessing that enough woundedness is present without rising to the excess of “impairment,” a 
strategic choice is being made to select for a particular range of a particular construct, while the 
assessors have simultaneously developed a  “technology” (whether formalized or just commonly 
understood) for measuring it. 
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The assessment of this characteristic is performed in a strategic space with another 
interactive participant, the applicant.  Whatever the applicant’s conscious or unconscious 
motivations in the interaction, the interviewer assesses this and other characteristics attempting 
to take the interviewee’s strategic behavior, his “screening” moves, and his emission of signals 
rather than signs, into account.  The iconic scene from The Princess Bride (1987) provides a 
useful model here: 
Now, a clever man would put the poison into his own goblet because he would know that 
only a great fool would reach for what he was given.  I am not a great fool, so I can 
clearly not choose the wine in front of you.  But you must have known I was not a great 
fool—you would have counted on it—so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of me. 
If the interviewee can intuit that an interviewer might be looking for that sweet spot of 
woundedness (and since she’s made it to the interview, let's give her intuition the benefit of the 
doubt), she would be clever to say, “I am exactly the right amount of wounded,” regardless of 
her true type.  Because the interviewer is not a great fool, he knows that he could be observing a 
signal rather than a sign, and so he makes the strategic choice to prompt her to demonstrate it.  
But neither is she a great fool, and so anticipating this, she had surreptitiously consulted with 
successful applicants and hammered out answers to the common interview questions she found 
on the internet.  And so he chooses to “weight” answers based on how spontaneous they sound, 
and she learns to make her rehearsed answers sound spontaneous, and so on. 
 Another variation on screening moves might be employed by an applicant or program 
that judges themselves likely to be desirable in the pool and that has strong preferences in terms 
of their potential “matches.”  Such an applicant or program might elect to be more honest about 
their controversial attributes, or if they are especially calculating or audacious, say something 
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that only their favorite kind of match would appreciate.  If successful, this move functions to 
determine and select for the chosen type of applicant or program, though they are banking on the 
right kind of match being able to recognize this signal.  A graduate program or training site that 
plays up the heavy demands placed on students employs a similar tactic in prompting distress-
tolerant, talented, or grandiose applicants to self-select.  The same move may also serve other 
functions such as being an “honest” warning, or a means for faculty and alumni to buttress 
personal pride about the “elite” nature of the organization with which they identify. 
The Strategic Implications of Learning, Nash Equilibria 
In the repeatedly aforementioned Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is generally possible for the 
players to cooperate if the game is repeated over and over because, “The successive rounds of 
the game give [the players] the opportunity to build up trust or mistrust, to reciprocate or placate, 
forgive or avenge.  In an indefinitely long game, the important point is that we can both win at 
the expense of the banker rather than at the expense of one another” (Dawkins, 1976). 
If I know that right after this round of “the prisoners dilemma” we are going to play another one, 
and then another one after that, I start to notice that what I do in this round might influence your 
behavior in subsequent rounds. I might start to say things like, “If you cooperate with me this 
round, I will cooperate with you next round,” and you suddenly have the opportunity to observe 
what I do this round, and use that information to decide whether or not to believe my promise 
next round. When the formal iterated prisoner’s dilemma is played in practice, one of the 
strongest strategies is known as “Tit for Tat” which “begins by cooperating on the first move and 
thereafter simply copies the previous move of the other player” (Dawkins, 1976 p. 271).  When 
Tit for Tat plays against itself, it has a totally cooperative series of games, but when it plays 
against strategies which defect without provocation, the pair fares worse overall.  When two 
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strategies that defect without provocation play against one another, they do still worse. 
(Dawkins, 1976) 
 Significantly, this is a game in which “play” consists of decisions between only two 
mutually-exclusive options; and yet despite its simplicity, it is immediately tempting to start to 
draw comparisons to nuanced aspects of human psychology as “personality traits” (McCrae & 
Costa, 2010). The comparison in the fates of “Tit for Tat” and more avaricious strategies in this 
experiment certainly have at least superficial similarity to a conclusion that a therapist might be 
tempted to draw about the relative “adaptiveness” of a client’s tendency to cooperate rather than 
to defect against trusting others. When it comes to human affairs, we just cannot quite decide 
whether “what goes around comes around,” or “no good deed goes unpunished,” but different 
contexts seem to favor one or the other view. 
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, because it is repeated, cooperation triumphs over self-
interest. The pre-built strategies Dawkins describes developed relationships with one another, 
and based their behaviors on idiosyncratic memory of those relationships, to a level of 
complexity equal to the complexity of the game (the relatively simple choice between cooperate 
and defect).  The exact opposite is true of the one-off version of the game, in which defection is 
the dominant strategy.  These “strategies” are single instances of the class of entities Harari 
(2017) describes as “algorithms” (a concept which can be extended to all living organisms, if one 
views them as “data processors”). In relationships between people in human society, clients and 
therapists, supervisors and supervisees, students and professors, applicants and interviewers, 
analogous systems of behavioral predictions based on extrapolation from learning history guide 
the players’ strategic decision-making, dependent on the players’ perception of the game they are 
playing. 
 
TRAINING GAMES                                                       23 
The mathematician and game theorist, John Nash, famously the subject of A Beautiful 
Mind (1998), introduced a concept that later became known as a “Nash Equilibrium,” which “is a 
system of beliefs and a profile of actions for which each player is playing a best response to his 
beliefs. . . a profile of strategies for which each player is choosing a best response to the 
strategies of all other players” (Tadelis, 2013 p. 80). Significantly, when all players are playing 
Nash equilibrium strategies, their “best play” in pursuit of their individual agenda is to continue 
playing the same strategy, assuming no one else changes tack (a safe assumption if the other 
players are also rational).  
If we assume that any human behavior is an individual’s perceived optimal response to 
any given game, it constitutes a Nash equilibrium between some combination of games played 
simultaneously at intrapsychic, interpersonal, intersubjective, systemic, and cultural levels.  As 
such, the equilibrium strategy (which in the “algorithmic” view of organisms equates to an 
algorithm’s moment-to-moment “output” in response to input-stimuli) is the set of behavioral 
“rules” that the individual has adopted as the best response to their developmental environment. 
“The capacity to interpret human behavior—to make sense of each other—requires the 
intentional stance: ‘treating the object whose behavior you want to predict as a rational agent 
with beliefs and desires’ (Dennett, 1987 in Fonagy et al, 2003 p. 416-417). At the same time, 
individuals’ predictive calculations in intersubjective interaction necessarily utilize idiosyncratic 
organizing principles, meaning that no two individuals will “output” the same “predictions” (or 
subjective understandings), even when placed in a superficially identical situation.  A client 
making sense of a therapist’s behavior relies on observations of the therapist’s behavior in 
conjunction with pre-existing understanding of what similar behavior has “meant” before.  As 
such, the client’s decision to employ a novel strategy in response to the therapist may depend on 
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the therapist defying the client’s expectations to a degree that the therapist’s behavior does not 
make sense within the client’s existing organization. 
Commitment Moves, “The Frame,” Psychotherapy, and Supervision 
In game theory, “commitment moves” are actions a player may take with the intention or 
the effect of influencing which moves the other player(s) make(s).  This often involves 
communication, as “when one player can move first and make his move known to the other 
player, or when the players can talk to each other before they move” (Straffin, 1993 p. 85). A 
simple example of a commitment move would be telling an adversary, “If you hit me, I will hit 
you back.”  The promise of a certain behavior (hitting back) is designed to dis-incentivize the 
opponent from taking an undesirable action (hitting in the first place) and seeks to alter the 
opponent’s choice of strategy.  The effectiveness of a commitment move is dependent on its 
credibility, meaning that my promise to behave in a certain way given a certain condition only 
affects my opponent’s decision-making to the degree to which she believes that my having made 
the promise will affect or reflects upon my subsequent decision-making.  In other words, my 
friends might be more likely to lend me money than a stranger would be, partially because my 
friend is more likely to perceive my promise to pay her back as credible (unless I have a 
particularly large outstanding debt with that friend already or with people she knows about).  
Another example would be the commitment in therapy and supervision relationships— 
made explicitly or implicitly by the therapist or supervisor—that “under no circumstances will 
we ever have sex.”  Relevant APA ethics codes include: 
3.02 “Sexual Harassment,” 3.05 “Multiple Relationships,” 3.06 “Conflicts of Interest,” 
7.07 “Sexual Relationships With Students and Supervisees,” 10.05 “Sexual Intimacies 
With Current Therapy Clients/Patients,” 10.06 “Sexual Intimacies With Relatives or 
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Significant Others of Current Therapy Clients/Patients,” 10.07 “Therapy With Former 
Sexual Partners,” and 10.08 “Sexual Intimacies With Former Therapy Clients/Patients” 
(American Psychological Association, 2017) 
Though the therapist or supervisor may conceptualize this commitment as an “ethical 
principle,” it is also a commitment move in that one of its functions is to affect the strategic 
decision making of the client or supervisee.  To the degree to which the client or supervisee 
perceives this commitment as credible, they mentally remove possible outcomes which involve a 
sexual relationship between themselves and their supervisor/therapist from their “psychological 
payout table” and alter their behavior accordingly. In practice, were this not the case, a 
hypothetical client who finds his therapist attractive might be well advised to selectively disclose 
only those thoughts and recollections which he thinks would be most likely to incite his 
therapist’s interest.  When the therapist communicates a credible commitment to abstain from 
this outcome no matter what, the client’s strategic calculus shifts, potentially toward the slightly 
less attractive “second place prize” of psychological growth, and disclosure of thoughts and 
recollections deemed most aligned with its service. Unsurprisingly, the incentive structure that 
emerges when the therapist feels free to initiate a sexual relationship with their attractive client 
and act accordingly in therapy is even more markedly opposed to the agenda of therapeutic 
change. 
 Graduate students of clinical psychology sit in a crossroads between arguably the most 
nuanced and ambiguous strategic situations encountered in a typical clinical career: providing 
therapy, being supervised, and supervising. To varying degrees depending on the personal 
strategies of the participants in any of these activities, the ambiguity of these situations are 
mitigated by a set of commitment moves wrapped up in the widely-discussed construct of the 
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“frame” of psychotherapy. (Langs, 1978) This construct incorporates both explicitly discussed 
“rules” (confidentiality and its limits, handling of dual relationships, etc.) and implicitly 
communicated “stances” which are gradually manifested through iterated interaction.  
The therapist’s prompt beginnings and endings, if they are consistent, serve as a credible 
commitment to continue in to begin and end sessions on time in the future.  This may have only 
practical effects on the dependability of clients’ and therapists’ schedules, or it may create for the 
pair a profound sense of security in the appointed hour; and for the client, grant the strategic 
freedom to enter into intimidating experiential states secure in the knowledge that “it will be over 
at 4:50, for sure.”  In intersubjective theory, the therapist’s emotional response to the client’s 
articulated and felt experience is seen to organize and reorganize that experience.  In the 
playspace of the intersubjective field, the psychotherapist chooses her moves with the aim of 
creating opportunities for adaptive reorganization.  In evaluating the strategic alternatives of 
various possible “things to say,” she aims at “attunement” and looks for utterances she predicts 
will both resonate with—and help “make sense of”—the client’s subjective experience  (Buirski, 
2005). She uses her own lifetime of experience as the working data pool that constitutes the 
predictive model she uses to calculate likelihood that a particular utterance will be received as 
“attuned,” referenced against her collected understanding of the client’s intersubjective 
organization and her particular position within it. 
 In supervision, whether vocalized or communicated implicitly through consistent 
behavior, supervisors may use commitment moves in an attempt to create goal-compatible 
incentives for supervisees.  The supervisor holds the dual roles of “evaluator” and “training 
provider” in the game of supervision, and these roles come with conflicting agendas.  Trainees 
“work to please their supervisors not only because of the immediate power differential but also 
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because of potentially lifelong ramifications for their careers, including grades, letters of 
recommendation, clinical appointments, and so on” (Karson, 2008 p. 201). When the evaluative 
role goes unmitigated by the supervisor’s commitment moves, the clever student chooses to 
show only their best tape, and summarize sessions in a way designed to highlight their 
competence, rather than to foster its development.  A supervisor's decision to adopt a policy of 
categorically abstaining from “praise,” or responding with neutral curiosity to good tape and bad 
tape alike—both work to balance the emotional reward of discussing the things the supervisee 
actually needs help with. 
 Consider the differences in strategy logically employed by a student whose primary 
agenda is “feeling like he is a ‘good’ therapist” compared to one rewarded by “moments where 
she notices and makes use of an opportunity for improvement.”  In the first case, the student’s 
equilibrium strategy will likely be something like finding the lowest-effort route to a standard 
subjectively perceived as just enough to meet the “good” benchmark, conceal his flaws from 
himself and others, and do her best to reject novel information that could threaten his “good-
therapist” identity.  The therapist who gets off on improvement, meanwhile, rationally chooses to 
seek and reimagine flaws in her technique, and to effortfully pursue novel and potentially 
superior methods.  Though the supervisor will encounter students that emit a variety of signals 
about their subscription to one or the other agenda, he is also able to play commitment moves 
which favor one agenda over the other.   
Mechanism Design, The Match 
A subfield of Game Theory called “Mechanism Design” inverts game theory’s strategic 
consideration by starting with a strategy the “designer” wants the players to play, and designing a 
game in which rational agents will behave as the designer intended (Börgers,  Krähmer, & 
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Strausz, 2015). In a sense, a mechanism is a strategic analog of an operant conditioning chamber 
or “Skinner Box” in that an agent playing a “designed mechanism” can be induced (through 
rational self-interest) to play a predetermined, “intended” strategy (pushing the “lever”) if 
structure of the game is designed so that “pushing the lever” is the optimal strategy. 
One of the most common of these “intentions” in mechanism design is known as 
“preference revelation” (McMillan, 1979) which describes strategic contexts in which players 
who choose their optimal or “equilibrium” strategy, in so doing, reveal their true characteristics. 
In practical terms, this is often the intention of auction houses trying to design a system that 
induces buyers to pay the highest amount they would be willing to pay for each item for sale.  
An “English Auction” is where an “auctioneer stands at the front of the room calling out 
ever-increasing bids” until only one bidder remains willing to pay the current bid. (Dixit & 
Nalebuff, 2008, p. 303).  This is an example of a game for which the optimal strategy is for 
players to bid their true highest value for goods, and thus reveal their “true” personal valuation 
preferences.  Preference revelation is also of central importance in the Association of Psychology 
Postdoctoral and Internship Centers (APPIC) national internship match where a “matching 
algorithm” presides over the process of funneling prospective interns to internship sites.  The 
task is modelled in a strategic construct called the “Stable Marriage Problem” in which agents of 
two types (here, “interns” and “internships”) are tasked with “pairing up” with mutual consent.  
The agents in the system are assumed to have the agenda of picking the most attractive “partner” 
according to their own personal taste.  The “question” in the stable marriage is how to achieve a 
situation where no one has anything to gain by leaving their partner for someone else, and all the 
“marriages” are therefore “stable” (Dubbins, 1981). If this condition were met, it would also 
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mean that the principle of preference revelation had been satisfied as all parties had behaved 
“honestly” regarding their preferences about partners.   
For all practical purposes, the “answer” to this question is “The Gale-Shipley Algorithm” 
(Dubbins, 1981) which in a slightly modified form, constitutes the core computational process of 
the APPIC Internship Match. Very roughly, it performs a series of iterations in which interns are 
all paired up with their highest remaining preference in available internships, and then the 
stragglers are allowed to “bump off” anyone to whom their prospective next-most-preferred 
internship prefers them.  Because this is modelled virtually, the computer running the algorithm 
can perform all possible pairings simultaneously and end up with only “stable” pairings, and 
“revealed” preferences (National Matching Services, 2017). 
What makes this algorithm so significant in the match (and tasks like it) is that neither 
internships nor interns can fare better individually by deceptively reporting their preferences 
about one another than they would by reporting preferences honestly.  And so they arrive at 
something much closer to outcome of the utopian vision of “honest” graduate applicant selection 
presented earlier than would be the case in the more defection-rewarding situation in which 
interns are “hired” on a one-by-one basis, and each pairing must be either taken or left 
permanently before other offers are considered.  
Though the task of actually assessing partners is performed in the same strategic fog as 
described previously in graduate admission interviews, the quality of “preference revelation” 
built into the ruleset of the match itself means that the applicant’s question, “Should I take this 
one? I have no idea if I’ll even get another offer,” and the myriad strategies that immediately 
erupt around it, are rendered obsolete.  This is a system built with the intention that “honesty 
pays,” and within its domain of influence, it enforces a “dominant strategy” of cooperation.  
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Tasks of mechanism design appear on multiple levels in the context of graduate training, 
from a therapist’s particular style of frame-setting, to a program director’s decisions about 
organizational policy.  These designers generally want the game for which they are writing the 
“rulebook” to have certain characteristics, though the desired characteristics vary widely based 
on the situation.   
Intra-systemic Conflict, Program Design 
 Though graduate institutions and training sites may set out to “create good 
psychologists,” various factors may subvert this goal in various ways. The dictates of “emotional 
safety” pathologize truth-telling, and the assumption that “we’re all just here to help people” 
blinds us to our own psychology. Organizational cultures conspire to expel potentially necessary 
new ideas, and program administrators select for evidence that “all is well” just as cracks appear 
in the institutional foundation. 
In multi-agent systems, even when agents are genuinely seeking to cooperate, there is 
conflict between alternative cooperative strategies, and even a therapist focused exclusively on 
creating a nurturing “holding environment” inevitably comes into conflict with her client’s pre-
existing organization of experience.  Strategies that systems employ for handling internal conflict 
are visible in the conflict resolution protocols in graduate programs’ policy manuals, and the 
spectrum of ways that supervisors and therapists respond to their counterparts’ challenges.  In 
some organizational cultures, classrooms, therapies, and individual psychologies, the stable 
strategy is some combination of disavowal, willful ignorance, and mandated self-censorship. 
This strategy may have a range of “side effects” such as consolidation of power (the dissatisfied 
must not complain), slow development (it’s hard to suggest improvements without disagreeing), 
and systemic fragility (new information and new participants can be devastating). 
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Any dynamic system necessarily relies on information-gathering about its own 
functioning in order to maintain functional equilibrium—a basic tenet in cybernetics (Bateson, 
1976).  For graduate training institutions, the ability of administrators, instructors, supervisors, 
and therapists to gather accurate information about the functioning of the systems they oversee is 
of central importance to the constant, repeated corrections necessary to keep the system on 
course. Rodriguez-Menendez et al (2017) point out two ways in which a program’s self-
assessment is likely to be confounded: “Program faculty may be making decisions and forming 
an understanding of situations based on their own perceptions of the student experience, 
regardless of whether the information is accurate,” and “program administrators and faculty may 
focus on those aspects of curricular delivery and clinical supervision which confirm the 
perceived views about the effectiveness of their curriculum, while ignoring aspects of their 
model which disconfirm their operational hypotheses” (p. 5). 
In other words, program administrators may see good psychologists being created when 
this is not the case. Though this problem is to some degree common to any “administration,” 
clinical psychology also has some unique struggles, such as a peculiar tendency to promote a 
view of its participants as primarily altruistic, and to stigmatize self-interest and overt conflict. 
Ivey and Partington (2012 p. 167) note that “typically, applicants for clinical psychology training 
claim some variation of the altruistic wish to alleviate people’s suffering” as their primary 
motivator in pursuing psychotherapy as a profession.  Institutional cultures which “buy in” to the 
claims of altruism—seeing it as a sign rather than a signal—design a training system for 
uncomplicated altruists which places significant constraints on the engagement of other 
motivations. Such a program (likely staffed by faculty and administrators that make similar 
claims) addresses motivations like professors’ self-aggrandizement, therapists’ voyeurism, and 
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students’ desire for leisure—through simple avoidance, and may miss out on the opportunity to 
confront them productively. As a counterexample, a strategy employed in the University of 
Denver Graduate School of Professional Psychology’s admissions essay prompt, which includes 
the instruction: “Avoid writing about the wish to help others or about how you want to contribute 
to society,” (“PsyD Essay Questions,” 2018) may alternately prompt a demonstration of self-
reflective capacity and serve as an implicit commitment move to incentivize honest self-
assessment in future play (assuming essay readers enforce it).  
“Nature,” a somewhat older system than clinical psychology graduate training, provides 
an interesting case study in a similar principle. In discussing the effects of the disappearance of 
large predators in a variety of ecosystems, Stolzenberg (2009) found that the presence of an apex 
predator in a given environment seems to actively preserve the biodiversity of the organisms on 
multiple tiers of the food chain below it.  The predator fosters the diversity of both carnivorous 
and herbivorous prey animals by preventing any one species gaining dominance, as well as 
diversity among plant life by teaching grazing animals to avoid the otherwise-tempting dense 
foliage where ambushes are most easily sprung.  Predators defend against scenarios in which a 
species of herbivore multiplies unrestrainedly, inevitably narrowing the host system’s plant life 
down to only those plants which the grazing animal cannot eat.  Conflict in ecosystems can be 
understood strategically by assuming that every organism’s “agenda” is to preserve and promote 
its particular genetic makeup (Dawkins, 1976).   
Similarly, in designing the ruleset for the multi-agent system of the new United States of 
America, the authors of the Constitution made the strategic decision to assume self-interest on 
the part of individual members of the constituent populace. The hope was that self-interested 
individuals could be placed in balanced opposition, rather than attempting to legislate against 
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“selfishness” and in so doing, brutally curtail “liberty.” In Federalist Paper #10, Madison 
articulates his justification for the specific architecture of the government, whose representatives 
“must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, 
however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the 
confusion of a multitude” (Hamilton, Jay & Madison, 2015 p. 45).  In his role as a “mechanism 
designer,” Madison proposed to “build in” the power-regulating function that big carnivores 
serve in ecosystems.  
Madison’s hope is that both the nature of the government—as well as the government 
itself—will affect the system in which it holds sway in specific ways. First, it becomes more able 
to accomodate to the introduction of novel strategies, or new “types” of agents.  Any specific 
strategy will be relatively unlikely to both be “killed off” and to “take over.”  Second, the system 
seems to become more durable both in a vacuum and in interaction with other systems. Both 
mechanisms are designed to handle intra-systemic conflict in ways that shape it to systemic 
advantage.  The presence of the predator species, and the formula Madison offers for 
governmental representation, both serve to challenge the dominance of coincidentally dominant 
things within the system.   
A  therapist and/or client face a similar task to that of the authors of the Constitution as 
they design the “government” for a society of two.  These designers attempt to structure their 
respective systems in a fashion that promotes things like freedom, collaboration, and the 
expression of diverse perspectives.  A therapist might conceptualize part of what she is doing as 
helping a client integrate a greater diversity of self-experiences by loosening the grip of whatever 
particular system of psychological self-oppression he happens to employ. Karson (2008) notes 
that this aim is ubiquitous among different schools of therapy: 
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 Every major school of therapy addresses the issue of empowering the marginalized, 
whether it’s Freud’s recovery of the repressed, cognitive therapy’s disputation of the 
party line, behaviorism’s suspicion about language and rules, systems theory’s 
investigation of oppressive or paradoxical role relationships, humanism’s celebration of 
the tyrannized, or intersubjecticity’s care not to blame the patient for the cocreated 
relationship. (Karson, 2008, p. 118) 
The “issue of empowering the marginalized” applies equally in the multi-agent system of 
individual psychology.  If forces within the psyche are like the independent agents in a system, 
then those agents may best exist in balance.“In the psyche, there should be a balance between a 
desire to satisfy a particular figure, and the needs of the person on the whole… a good 
psychological organization should also protect the entire populace from tyranny, [and] encourage 
and facilitate diversity (by recognizing that not everyone is the same, and that as many needs 
should be met as possible)” (Karson, 2001 p. 64-65).  And yet, many of the strategic realities in 
graduate institutions may function to confound this very goal. 
 
Conclusion 
 What Stolzenberg prescribes for ecosystems, Madison for governments, and Karson for 
therapies might be productively applied to the games in which psychotherapists are trained. 
While the phrase “freedom from tyranny” may sound a bit overwrought for application to things 
like the protection of critical thinking in graduate school classrooms, the silencing of minority 
viewpoints robs as much from classrooms as it does from society.  Clinical psychology is awash 
both in the technology of productive strategic change, and in sophisticated methods for 
understanding agentic motivation.  The lens of game theory provides a useful system for 
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understanding how the nature of the games that agents play and perceive affect their strategic 
play, and viewing training contexts strategically renders them subject to strategic intervention.  
Game theory encourages a view of suboptimal behavior as an optimal response to a suboptimal 
game, and in applying this lens to clinical psychology graduate training, it suggests building 
better games. 
 This paper has explored a handful of training contexts as “games” and articulated some of 
the strategic considerations faced by the agents playing them.  The exploration has been 
relatively shallow in scope, and it has almost categorically neglected the issue of what optimal 
play and optimal game design might actually be, in pursuit of creating maximally competent 
psychotherapists. The determination of optimal play for students, supervisors, professors, and 
administrators represents a potentially substantial basis for productive future inquiry.  
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